Constitutional Law - Fourteenth Amendment - Due Process Clause - Civil Rights - Section 1983 - Corporal Punishment by Stevens, Richard A.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 19 Number 4 Article 9 
1981 
Constitutional Law - Fourteenth Amendment - Due Process 
Clause - Civil Rights - Section 1983 - Corporal Punishment 
Richard A. Stevens 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard A. Stevens, Constitutional Law - Fourteenth Amendment - Due Process Clause - Civil Rights - 
Section 1983 - Corporal Punishment, 19 Duq. L. Rev. 801 (1981). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol19/iss4/9 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE- CIVIL RIGHTS- SECTION 1983- CORPORAL PUNISHMENT- The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a
public school student severely injured by the use of disciplinary corporal
punishment can press substantive due process claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for deprivation of the fourteenth amendment right to bodily security.
Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
Naomi Faye Hall was a thirteen-year-old student at the Left Hand
Grade School in Roane County, West Virginia.1 On December 6, 1974,
one of her teachers administered a spanking2 resulting in Naomi's
hospitalization for ten days for treatment of traumatic injuries to her
thigh and possible permanent injuries to her spine.3 Prior to this inci-
dent, Naomi's parents had advised school officials, including the
teacher who had performed the paddling, that they did not want their
child corporally punished.
4
Naomi's parents5 brought an action in federal district court under 42
U.S.C. § 19831 against various officials and employees of the school
1. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 609 (4th Cir. 1980).
2. Naomi and her parents alleged that the teacher struck Naomi with a homemade
paddle made of hard, thick rubber about five inches in width, shoved her against a large,
stationary desk, and vehemently twisted her arm before continuing to strike her Oith the
rubber paddle. The complaint alleged that Naomi was struck "without apparent provoca-
tion." I& at 614.
The teacher asserted that Naomi refused, despite repeated warnings, to follow
established standards for entering and exiting the school in order to conserve heat on cold
days. According to the instructor, when he attempted to administer punishment to Naomi
for repeatedly going in and out of the doors on one of the coldest days of the year, she
called him a "goddamn sonavabitch" and a "liar" and then kicked and struck him. Id. See
Brief for Appellees at 2, 3.
3. 621 F.2d at 614.
4. I& at 610.
5. Faye Elizabeth Hall sued in the capacity of next friend and mother of her minor
child, Naomi; and with Bervin E. Hall, Naomi's father, in their own right, and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated. I& at 607.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 applies to those actions done under color of
state authority which deprive persons of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution because section 1983 was passed pursuant to the four-
teenth amendment and is construed in light of the purposes of that amendment. Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
.802 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 19:801
system7 alleging violations of Naomi's constitutional rights to pro-
cedural and substantive due process,8 to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment,9 and to equal protection of the laws." Naomi's parents also
alleged violations of their substantive due process right to choose their
child's discipline." The United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia dismissed the action. As authority for its
dismissal, the district court relied primarily upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Ingraham v. Wright.2 The Ingraham Court found that the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment does
not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools, and
further concluded that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment does not require notice and hearing prior to the use of corporal
punishment."3 Naomi and her parents appealed the district court's dis-
missal contending that their substantive due process claims were
valid."
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Owen,"5 the
7. The complaint named as defendants G. Garrison Tawney, Naomi's instructor;
Bernard Claywell, the principal of the school who was present for part of the paddling,
John Kingery, former superintendent of the county school system; Lonnie Canterbury,
superintendent at the time of the incident; and five county Board of Education members.
621 F.2d at 609. A fifth count alleged a state assault and battery tort claim against
Tawney alone. Ia at 609 n.1.
8. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in perti-
nent part: "No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person ... equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
9. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted."
10. See note 8 supra.
11. Hall v. Tawney, No. 75-0190 CH (S.D. W. Va., May 16, 1978).
12. 621 F.2d at 609. See 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
13. 430 U.S. at 682.
14. 621 F.2d at 609. Naomi and her parents conceded that the decision in Ingraham
foreclosed their procedural due process and cruel and unusual punishment claims. Conse-
quently, they asserted only their substantive due process claims on appeal. 621 F.2d at
609-10.
15. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975)(summary affirmance).
In Baker the plaintiff parents had informed school officials that they did not want their
child spanked. Nevertheless, their child was given two licks with a desk drawer divider
slightly thicker than a ruler. Noting that the Court had acknowledged the constitutional
stature of parental rights in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the district court in Baker determined that the
fourteenth amendment concept of liberty embraced the right of parents to determine the
mode of discipline for their children. According to the court, however, such a right is not
fundamental. Because corporal punishment furthers a rational and legitimate state inter-
est of maintaining discipline, the state's interest prevailed over parents' rights. 395 F.
Supp. at 298-300.
Naomi and her parents argued that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit" rejected the
parents' substantive due process claim, finding that, although parents'
rights to determine the manner of disciplining their children are con-
stitutionally protected, those rights are overborne by the countervail-
ing interests of the state in maintaining discipline in public schools.1 7
Before proceeding to a consideration of Naomi's substantive due process
claim, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court has refused
to decide whether substantive due process claims such as the one
asserted by Naomi are valid. 8 Believing this refusal to be an indication
that substantive due process rights might be implicated in school
disciplinary punishments, 9 the Hall court concluded that the infliction
of corporal punishment by state officials may under some cir-
cumstances give rise to a section 1983 claim to vindicate substantive
due process rights." The court relied on the principle that federal con-
stitutional rights may exist in parallel with state rights and that relief
under section 1983 does not depend upon the unavailability of state
remedies, but is supplementary to them.21 Recognizing that the district
court's dismissal of the action disposed of the controversy on the
pleadings alone, the court of appeals remanded the case for further
proceedings on Naomi's claim of substantive due process violations.2
The court then went on to shape the substantive due process right
district court's decision in Baker did not constitute binding precedent because a summary
affirmance only affirms the judgment that was reached. Brief for Appellants at 36. See
also Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977), and Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92
(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Hall court rejected this argument, noting that the
Supreme Court has subsequently cited its summary affirmance of Baker, stating that
"parental approval of corporal punishment is not constitutionally required." 621 F.2d at
610 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 662 n.22). Moreover, the Hall court indicated
that it was willing to accept the reasoning of Baker even without the express imprimatur
of the Supreme Court. 621 F.2d at 610 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16
(1972), where the Court declared that every person cannot make his own standards on
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has an important interest).
16. Judge Phillips wrote the decision of the unanimous panel which also included
Judges Winter and Butzner.
17. 621 F.2d at 610.
18. Id See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 659 n.12, 679 n.47.
19. 621 F.2d at 612. In his dissent in Ingraham, Justice White argued that the ma-
jority holding could not be construed to mean that a substantive due process claim might
have existed, as this would mean that the plaintiffs were precluded from relief simply
because of an error in drafting their complaint. 430 U.S. at 689 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
The Hall court recognized the logic of Justice White's argument, but believed that the
Court's express reservation of the issue indicates the possible existence of a substantive
due process right. 621 F.2d at 611 n.4.
20. 621 F.2d at 611.
21. Id at 612 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)).
22. 621 F.2d at 611.
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it had recognized.3 The court began by noting that because corporal
punishment reasonably relates to a legitimate state interest of main-
taining order in the public schools, it does not per se violate substan-
tive due process rights. 4 The court concluded, however, that such
punishment is not privileged regardless of its severity or con-
sequence.'5 According to the court, the use of corporal punishment is
limited by the individual's constitutional right to bodily security, which
guards against state intrusions into personal privacy in manners which
are shocking to the conscience.
The court next discussed the differences between a substantive due
process right and a state assault and battery claim. A right under
state tort law may well turn upon whether the number of licks ad-
ministered during disciplinary action was excessive. In contrast,
substantive due process is violated only if the use of force is inspired
by malice and so disproportionate to the need that it causes severe in-
juries so shocking to the conscience that it constitutes an inhumane
abuse of official power.2 Examining the facts alleged in Naomi's com-
plaint,' the court determined that they were sufficient to state a claim
for which relief could be granted under section 1983.2 Hence, it was error
23. Id. The court recognized the dangers of expounding constitutional doctrine on
the basis of bare-bones pleadings. Id. at 611 n.6.
24. Id. at 611.
25. Id. at 612. In so concluding, the Hall court agreed with the dissenters from the
court of appeals opinion in Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). There, the dissenters contested the majority's conclusion that
the legitimacy of corporal punishment in public schools did not depend on its severity or
frequency. 525 F.2d at 920-21 (Godbold, J., dissenting); id. at 925-26 (Rives, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court's affirmance of the Ingraham decision was not considered by the Hall
court to have eroded the persuasiveness of those dissenting opinions. 621 F.2d at 612.
26. 621 F.2d at 613. The court cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
(evidence excluded because forcible use of a stomach pump by police shocks the con-
science and violates the due process clause); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.) (un-
provoked beating of pretrial detainee by guard violates the due process clause and is
actionable under section 1983), cer& denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); and Jenkins v. Averett,
424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970) (reckless pistol shooting of suspect by police violates in-
dividual's right to physical integrity under the fourth amendment and is actionable under
section 1983).
27. Id. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172; Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
Because recovery under a substantive due process claim requires such brutal action,
a careless or unwise excess of zeal would not constitute a violation of the constitutional
right of bodily security, whereas unwarranted zealousness might form the basis of state
tort law. Because the standards for section 1983 are so high, courts are not forced to sit in
judgment over the appropriateness of specific punishments for specific forms of miscon-
duct. 621 F.2d at 613.
28. See note 2 supra.
29. 621 F.2d at 614-15. The court remanded Naomi's substantive due process and
state tort claims, realizing that upon further development the facts of the incident may
not support a claim of violation of substantive due process. Id. at 614.
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for the district court to have dismissed Naomi's complaint against the
teacher and principal who took part in the paddling. 0 The court affirmed
the dismissal of Naomi's complaint against other members of the
school system who were named as defendants but who were not directly
involved in the incident. 1
In recognizing a substantive due process right under section 1983 to
redress injuries inflicted by public school teachers administering ex-
cessive corporal punishment, the court of appeals in Hall has addressed
an issue on which the United States Supreme Court has been silent.
The Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright decided only the pro-
cedural due process issue implicated by public school disciplinary cor-
poral punishment, expressly reserving decision on the availability of a
substantive due process claim.32
In Ingraham the Court held that freedom from punishment and bodily
restraint is within the liberty interest of personal security which has
historically been afforded the protection of procedural due process.3
Although the Ingraham Court recognized that a school child has strong
interests in procedural safeguards, it denied the student's claim,
believing that traditional common law remedies offer sufficient due
process protection, and that the imposition of procedural safeguards
would intrude into the educational responsibility of public school
authorities.3
The Court in Ingraham also held that the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the eighth amendment 5 does not apply to disciplinary
30. 621 F.2d at 615.
31. Id The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the parents' claim, see
note 15 and text accompanying notes 15 and 16 supra, reversing and remanding only
Naomi's substantive due process and state tort claims. 621 F.2d at 615. The reversal was
further qualified to include only the teacher who administered the punishment and the
principal who was present during the incident. Id. at 614-15. The court decided that the
complaint did not state sufficient substantive due process claims against any of the other
defendants because it did not specifically allege that they participated in, directed, super-
vised, authorized, or condoned the specific incident upon which the claim was based. Id at
615. Section 1983 does not utilize agency principles. To hold any principals liable for the
conduct of their agents, the principal must have been personally involved or have enacted
or supported a deliberate policy to violate the rights of plaintiffs class. Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976) (mayor and high police officials not responsible for action of a minority
of police officers on staff because evidence did not establish deliberate policy enacted or
supported by defendants to violate the rights of plaintiffs class); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550
F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977) (superintendent of jails not personally involved in the deprivation
of plaintiffs rights; respondeat superior not applicable).
The Hall action was not appealed and has been settled. Letter from Richard E. Rowe
(counsel for appellees) to author (Sept. 22, 1980).
32. 430 U.S. at 659 n.12, 679 n.47; see text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
33. 430 U.S. at 672-73.
34. Id. at 672, 680-82.
35. See note 9 supra.
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corporal punishment in public schools because the history of the eighth
amendment makes it clear that the clause was designed to protect only
those individuals convicted of crime. 8 The dissenters in Ingraham
disagreed with the majority's narrow view that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause does not apply to non-criminal punishment, regard-
less of how barbaric, inhumane, or severe.37
The Hall decision reconciles the concerns of the dissenters in In-
graham that non-criminal punishment deserves constitutional protec-
tion with the majority's holding that prohibitions against cruel and
unusal punishment apply only in criminal matters. The court in Hall
concluded that the fourteenth amendment 38 guards against excessive
punishment of school children in the same manner that the eighth
amendment protects criminal offenders from cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The court believed that it was necessary to recognize a four-
teenth amendment right to bodily security when that same right was
unavailable under the eighth amendment solely because the state in-
trusion occured in a non-criminal context.3 9 By allowing public school
children severely injured by corporal punishment to press substantive
due process claims under section 1983, the court has provided them
with the constitutional protection that has been provided in the
criminal context." The court noted that the right to bodily security
protected by substantive due process is substantially congruent with
the protection offered by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment. 1
In extending the constitutional right to bodily security to school
children, the Hall court relied upon decisions upholding the substan-
tive due process rights of criminal suspects.42 Although such rights
have been afforded persons charged with crimes and in the custody of
police officers,' 3 it does not necessarily follow that they should be
afforded to school children under the disciplinary control of public
school teachers. The educational and social environment of the public
school must be critically compared with the characteristics of the
criminal justice system. In Ingraham the Supreme Court compared the
prisoner and the school child, concluding that the openness of the
public school, its supervision by the community, and state civil and
36. 430 U.S. at 668-71.
37. Id. at 691-92 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined
in Justice White's dissent.
38. See note 8 supra.
39. 621 F.2d at 611 n.5.
40. See note 26 supra.
41. 621 F.2d at 611 n.5.
42. 621 F.2d at 613 n.7. See note 26 supra.
43. See note 26 supra.
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criminal liability for teachers who inflict excessive punishment
rendered notice and hearing prior to the use of corporal punishment
unnecessary." Even though the distinctions set forth in Ingraham may
not be dispositive of a substantive due process claim, the Hall court
should have considered these characteristics of the public school
system in its examination of the substantive due process right.,5
Although a public school is an open institution, children are captive
and subject to their teachers' discipline during the school day. The
community's supervision of the school is but one control over teacher
excesses; however, this should not preclude a remedy when teacher ex-
cesses occur despite the supervision. Finally, although state remedies
may exist, these do not preclude section 1983 relief.46 Many of the real
differences that do exist between the public school system and the
criminal justice system become unimportant when an individual is un-
fairly abused and severely injured. Thus, the Hall court was correct in
assuming that differences in environment are unimportant when a
substantive due process right is violated. But because the Supreme
Court in Ingraham enunciated and relied upon distinctions between the
public school and the criminal justice systems,'7 the Hall court should
have expressly stated its reasons for ignoring the differences that may
exist.
The Hall court's decision expands the scope of section 1983 claims
during a period when the Supreme Court has been restricting the
scope of such claims.'8 When the Supreme Court determined that relief
44. 430 U.S. at 670.
45. The Hall court noted that the rule of constitutional law announced by its deci-
sion may be difficult to apply in the public school disciplinary context, but stated that its
application would be no more difficult than in related realms already well established. 621
F.2d at 613.
46. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 174.
47. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
48. Section 1983 has not been expanded to protect rights not specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights even though the Supreme Court has had the opportunity
to make such an expansion in two decisions. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), area
police chiefs in Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky, distributed a flyer to local
merchants identifying subjects known to be active shoplifters. The plaintiff, Davis, had
been arrested and charged with shoplifting and was therefore listed in the flyer. Shortly
after the distribution, all charges against Davis were dropped. Davis asserted that he had
been deprived of liberty protected by procedural due process of the fourth amendment
and that being called an active shoplifter would inhibit him from entering business
establishments and would impair future employment opportunities. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that Davis had alleged facts
establishing an unconstitutional denial of due process and therefore reversed the district
court's dismissal of Davis' claim. Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1183 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd,
424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Supreme Court recognized that Davis appeared to state a classic
claim for defamation. 424 U.S. at 697. The Court, however, refused to find a liberty interest
1981
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under section 1983 could exist in parallel with state remedies, 9 section
1983 protected only those rights specifically guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights and applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment."
Concerned that section 1983 might unleash a floodgate of tort law
claims against state officials,51 the Supreme Court has never applied
section 1983 protection to those penumbra rights recognized but not
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights" The right to bodily
security is such a penumbra right because it is a liberty interest
recognized under the fourteenth amendment, but not specifically ar-
ticulated in the Bill of Rights.0 Although the Hall court's expansion of
in reputation, despite previous decisions which had suggested that reputation would be
recognized as a core liberty interest. Id. at 698. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75
(1975) (high school student could not be suspended without notice and hearing; the due
process clause is invoked where a person's reputation is at stake); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (Court stated that if the nonrenewal of a state university
teacher's employment contract had been based on a charge of dishonesty or immorality,
due process rights would be implicated); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971) (state statute that provides for "posting" without notice or hearing, with respect to
any person who "by excessive drinking" produces certain conditions or exhibits specified
traits, such as exposing himself or family "to want" or becoming "dangerous to the peace"
of the community, is unconstitutional; where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential). See generally
McClellan & Northcross, Remedies and Damages for Violations of Constitutional Rights,
18 DuQ. L. R.v. 409, 422-23, 471 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McClellan & Northcross].
In Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), the plaintiff filed a claim under section
1983 asserting that a sheriff's negligent failure to investigate his protests of mistaken
identity constituted a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Id. at 141. The
Supreme Court reversed the finding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit that a valid claim of false imprisonment under section 1983 had been stated, Mc-
Collan v. Tate, 575 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1978), holding that no constitutional claim ex-
isted because the detention was made pursuant to a warrant conforming to the re-
quirements of the fourth amendment. 443 U.S. at 143. See generally McClellan & North-
cross, supra at 435-36.
49. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 174.
50. In Paul v. Davis the Supreme Court emphasized that, according to Monroe v.
Pape, to recover under section 1983 one must point to a specific constitutional guarantee
safeguarding the asserted interest. 424 U.S. at 700-01 (citing 365 U.S. at 171). See generally
McClellan & Northcross, supra note 48, at 437.
51. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 699.
52. See McClellan & Northcross, supra note 48, at 437.
53. The Court in Rochin discussed the indefinite and vague character of the due
process clause, pointing out that
"due process of law" requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pur-
sued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated,
on a detached consideration of conflicting claims .... on a judgment not ad hoc and
episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and a change
in a progressive society.
342 U.S. at 172 (citation omitted). The Court concluded that illegally breaking into the
privacy of the accused in a manner shocking to the conscience violates due process.
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section 1983 appears to break with the Supreme Court's pattern of
restricting section 1983, the court did place limitations on the right
which they found. The Hall court restricted the boundaries of the right
by requiring that the state action be inspired by malice and be so
disproportionate to the need that it shocks the conscience of the
court.4 This standard, combined with the aberrational nature of ex-
cessive corporal punishment cases, should sufficiently limit the number
of corporal punishment cases that might be brought under section
1983. Thus, the Hall court's expansion of section 1983 is warranted: the
limitations imposed by the court prevent an overburdening of federal
court dockets, but at the same time give a severely injured child the
opportunity to plead her case in what may be a fairer forum than a
state court.15
Richard A. Stevens
54. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
55. The Supreme Court in Monroe stated:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation [the Civil Rights Act] was
passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of pre-
judice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the State ....
365 U.S. at 180. See also Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977); 39
U. PiTT. L. REV. 770, 789 (1978).
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